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ABSTRACT 
Losses due to fraudulent activities are particularly troublesome in the nonprofit sector 
because they directly reduce resources available to address tax-exempt purposes.  The ensuing 
bad publicity may also reduce contributions and grants in subsequent periods.  This paper uses 
data provided by Certified Fraud Examiners to report on the types of fraud they identified in 
nonprofit organizations and the characteristics of both the victims and the perpetrators of the 
fraudulent activities. Based on the analysis of the data, the authors suggest ways that fraud losses 
can be prevented or mitigated. In particular, governing boards are urged to consider important 
controls in addition to the annual financial statement audit. 
 
Key words: fraud in nonprofits; types of fraud; internal controls; audit committee; 
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AN INVESTIGATION OF FRAUD IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: 
OCCURRENCES AND DETERRENTS 
 
Media attention has focused recently on cases of fraud and abuse in all sectors of the 
economy.  The growing nonprofit sector is certainly a tantalizing target with $665 billion in 
revenues.  In addition, many people have potential access to nonprofit revenues and assets since 
nine percent of all workers are employed within the sector (nearly 12 million people) and an 
estimated 65 million adults provide volunteer services each year.1  While the breadth of the 
problem is unknown, recent media reports suggest the level of fraud might be extensive. For 
example, the FBI reported that more than two thousand of the internet sites soliciting relief for 
Hurricane Katrina victims were fraudulent (Aviv 2005, p. 9). Below are other recent headlines 
that suggest that a considerable problem may exist: 
• FTC wants AmeriDebt founder to refund $172 million (Ambrose 2005) 
• Ex-lawman convicted in big charity scam (Gathright 2004) 
• As charitable cheating rises, so does cost to taxpayers (USA Today 2005) 
• Tax Abuse Rampant in Nonprofits, IRS Says (Crenshaw 2005) 
• California:  Jail term for charity fraud (The New York Times 2004) 
• Two former officers of Dallas charity ordered to pay $14 million in damages 
(Healy 2004) 
These headlines all postdate the Senate Finance Committee hearings and legislative 
initiatives that were inspired by earlier nonprofit scandals.  This suggests a continuing problem 
although many nonprofit leaders claim that publicity focuses almost exclusively on those few 
“bad apples” within the sector.   
Little empirical research has been conducted to see if there are, in fact, only a few 
instances of fraud among nonprofit organizations and whether fraud is comparatively less 
prevalent in the nonprofit sector.  An understanding of the extent of fraud in the nonprofit sector 
is important for several reasons.  First, every dollar lost to fraud represents a lost ability to 
provide needed public services.  Second, the sector is facing increased public scrutiny primarily 
as a result of the widespread availability of detailed financial information (Gordon et al 1999).  
Finally, a “Gresham’s Law” may be at work, where publicized fraud cases may result in an 
unwillingness of donors to give to any nonprofit (Greenlee 2000). 
Although empirical research examining fraud has been conducted in the business sector 
(Sharma 2004, Carcello and Nagy 2004), the little existing research into nonprofit sector fraud 
has been based on newspaper reports (Fremont-Smith 2004a, Fremont-Smith and Kosaras 2003, 
Gibelman and Gelman 2001, 2002).  Unfortunately, articles published in newspapers do not get 
at the real extent of fraud in the sector since most fraud goes unreported (Ayers 2006).  A survey 
conducted by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) estimates that all 
organizations lose on average six percent of their revenue to fraud every year (ACFE 2005).  
Applying this percentage to the nonprofit sector would suggest that the fraud loss would be 
approximately $40 billion each year. 
Rather than media reports of suspected fraud, this paper analyzes information on actual 
fraud cases reported by ACFE members. Survey data provided by ACFE is used to explore the 
following questions: 
1. What are the characteristics of organizations that experience fraud? 
2. What types of fraud are committed? 
3. How are frauds first detected? 
4. What anti-fraud methods are used and do they work? 
5. Who perpetrates these frauds? 
6. What are the legal outcomes? 
The paper is organized as follows.  The first section defines the concept of fraud.  We 
then briefly describe previous studies that have examined this subject in both the business and 
nonprofit sectors.  Following this literature review is a description of our study followed by the 
findings and implications for fraud prevention.   
1. Literature Review 
Fraud is defined in Miriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law (1996) as “any act, expression, 
omission, or concealment calculated to deceive another to his or her disadvantage.”  Under 
common law (J. T. Wells 2005), four elements must exist for fraud to be present: 
1. A statement is materially false. 
2. Knowledge that the statement is false when made. 
3. A victim relies on the statement. 
4. The victim suffers damages as a result of relying on the false statement. 
This definition can encompass an extensive range of activities as illustrated by the 
following examples pertinent to nonprofit entities. 
• Occupational fraud, e.g., a nonprofit employee overcharges his or her employer 
for travel expenses or steals cash from the bank account. 
• Consumer fraud, e.g., an attendee at a fund raising auction replaces the price tag 
on an item with the goal of purchasing it at a lower price. 
• Insurance fraud, e.g., a nonprofit policy holder falsely claims its van or car has 
been stolen with the goal of collecting the value of the “stolen” vehicle in cash. 
• Medicare fraud, e.g., a nonprofit healthcare worker “codes” services rendered 
with the goal of increasing Medicare reimbursement to the organization. 
This paper focuses on occupational fraud which is “the use of one’s occupation for 
personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing 
organization’s resources or assets” (J. T. Wells 2005, 44).  Two major types of occupational 
fraud exist:  fraud against the organization (such as the misappropriation of cash or other assets, 
or the use of one’s position to benefit one’s self or others) and fraud by the organization against 
its “owners” or stakeholders (such as misstating financial statements).  Figure 1 details various 
types of occupational fraud. 
1.1  Fraud in Businesses Entities 
An increasing quantity of empirical research dealing with fraud in the business sector has 
focused on fraud against the owners.  KPMG (2003) reported that the incident of fraud was 
rising as compared to a similar survey five years earlier.  Three-quarters of surveyed companies 
reported that they had experienced fraud within the prior 12 months. Employee fraud was the 
most common, followed by consumer fraud.  Least common was financial reporting fraud, but it 
was the most costly type of fraud for victim organizations.  Beasley (1996), Rezaee (2005), 
Sharma (2004), Dunn (2004) and Farber (2004) focused on the relationship(s) between corporate 
governance and financial statement fraud.  All found that the likelihood of financial statement 
fraud increases as the number of outside members on a firm’s board of directors decreases.  
Carcello and Nagy (2004) found no relationship between audit firm tenure and financial 
statement fraud, using SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued 
between 1990 and 2001 that alleged a violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act.  
1.2  Fraud in Nonprofit Entities 
Fraud among nonprofit entities may also be on the rise. Jamie Katz with the Attorney 
General’s State Charity Office in Massachusetts reports that nonprofit fraud cases in the state 
have been higher during the past five years as compared to the previous decade.  Due to the lack 
of regulatory resources, action may not always be taken. In the telemarketing area, he reports 
finding a number of cases where fees paid to solicitors have been reported as program expenses 
(personal communication, May 11, 2006). 
Prior literature has conjectured that fraud may be easier to perpetrate in a nonprofit 
organization. For example, Douglas and Mills (2000) argue that an atmosphere of trust, the 
difficulty in verifying certain revenue streams, weaker internal controls, lack of business and 
financial expertise and reliance on volunteer boards are all contributory factors. Prior research 
into the existence of fraud in the nonprofit sector has differed significantly from business sector 
research in two ways: (1) the focus has been on fraud against the organization rather than against 
the owners of the organization and (2) newspaper reports have been the empirical source.  
Gibelman and Gelman’s (2001, 2002) studies focus on governance issues rather than dollars lost.  
Their 2001 paper concentrated on a limited number of international and U.S. nonprofit 
organizations involved in the financing or delivery of health care or human services.  Their 2002 
paper, which examined public allegations of both financial and non-financial misconduct in 
faith-based organizations, found that these organizations were as vulnerable to such wrongdoing 
as were secular organizations.  Fremont-Smith and Kosaras’ (2003) study of fraud was more 
extensive.  They examined newspaper articles published from 1998 – 2002 that described frauds 
perpetrated by officers or directors of all types of charitable organizations.  They found 131 
cases, with a median loss in excess of $130,000. Fremont-Smith (2004a) gathered published 
accounts of alleged criminal acts by employees of nonprofit organizations that were reported for 
the first time in 2003.  She found 32 cases with fraud losses ranging from $1,209 to $1,900,000.  
The total amount stolen was over seven million dollars. Fremont-Smith (2004a) provides 
aggregate descriptive information on the nonprofit sub-sample from the 2004 ACFE survey; the 
underlying data from this survey is the basis of our paper.   
Financial statement fraud tends to generate the largest losses for victim organizations 
(ACFE 2005, KPMG 2003).  In the nonprofit sector, expense misreporting may be the most 
prevalent type of financial statement fraud.  The largely anecdotal evidence on this topic has 
recently been more rigorously examined by Krishan et al. (2006). For a sample of 101 charities 
that received contributions from individuals and corporations, 38 nonprofits reported an average 
of $7 million (66 percent) less fundraising on their Form 990 than on their audited financial 
statements. There are a number of valid reasons other than fraud that might explain the Krishnan 
et al. finding, including systematic differences in reporting requirements (Keating and Frumkin 
2003), However, donors and regulators often rely on program expense ratios from the publicly 
available Form 990 return and the differences could be due to deliberate misreporting. 
1.3 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE)  
The ACFE uses a different approach to examining fraud.  Since 1996, they have surveyed 
members regarding the details of fraud cases the ACFE members have investigated (ACFE 1997, 
2003, 2005).  The ACFE distributes a questionnaire by mail to randomly selected members in the 
United States typically employed in government, business and public accounting. Survey 
recipients are asked to provide information on the case, or cases, that they have most recently 
investigated that meet specified criteria: the case had to involve occupational fraud that had 
occurred within the last two years, the investigation had to be complete and the CFE had to be 
reasonably sure that the perpetrator had been identified.  
ACFE’s Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse published in 2005 
focuses on both internal and external fraud.  Five hundred eight cases of occupational fraud, 
representing more than $761 million in losses, are studied in depth.  Although the true extent of 
fraud is unknown, participants in the survey, anti-fraud experts with a median of 16 years of 
experience, collectively estimated that the United States economy loses approximately six 
percent of its Gross Domestic Product to fraud each year, or approximately $600 billion.  Median 
loss per firm in the business sector was $110,000.  Although the median loss for the smallest 
organizations ($98,000 for firms employing fewer than 100 employees), was somewhat less than 
for the largest organizations ($105,000 for firms employing more than 10,000 employees), the 
impact of losses was disproportionately greater for the smaller organizations.   
The ACFE’s Report to the Nation (2005) segregated its findings by sector. Table 1 
displays the percentage of fraud incidents by type of organization.  The ACFE found that both 
payroll and check tampering fraud were more common in the nonprofit sector than in the 
business sector while false invoices and skimming revenues were more prevalent in for-profit 
entities (Well 2005a, 52).  However, the ACFE report focuses primarily on business 
organizations.   
2. Data and Methodology 
Our paper uses the 2004 survey data provided to us by the ACFE to more thoroughly 
examine occupational fraud in the nonprofit sector.  The surveys provide the most complete in-
depth data presently available concerning fraud in the nonprofit sector.  The seventeen-page 
survey instrument used to collect the data focused on the following six areas: cost of 
occupational fraud, methods used to commit fraud, methods used to detect fraud, characteristics 
of the organizations victimized by fraud, characteristics of the perpetrators of fraud, and legal 
outcomes of the fraud. 
Of the 508 occupational fraud cases reported by ACFE members (Table 1), 58 of the 
cases occurred in nonprofit organizations. The survey explicitly does not ask the respondees to 
provide the name of the organization, thus all data is anonymous. Given the small size of the data 
set, we provide primarily descriptive statistics using bivariate correlations (as appropriate) to test 
the significance of selected relationships between variables.  
3. Findings 
Fraud losses in the 58 nonprofit cases ranged from a low of $200 to $17 million, with a 
median loss of $100,000. Four nonprofits realized losses of more than $1,000,000.  An equal 
number of organizations saw losses of $2,000 or less.  The total loss from all nonprofit frauds 
was nearly $30 million.  If the estimated annual loss of $40 billion is correct, the cases reported 
in the survey represent less than one percent of all losses. 
3.1 Victims and Perpetrators of Fraud in Nonprofit Organizations 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics related to the organizations where fraud 
occurred and the employees who engaged in the fraudulent activities.  The typical organization 
employed less than 100 (53.0 percent) people and had been in operation for 30 years.  However, 
distribution was skewed with the mean size at 4,606 employees and organization age ranging 
from one to 183 years. Given that a fraud occurred, there appears to be no significant relation 
between the size of the fraud and the size or age of the organization as seen in Table 3.  
Since the survey asked about occupational fraud, all of the reported frauds were 
committed by employees, managers or executives of the victimized organization. The 
respondents provided information on perpetrators’ position, salary, gender, educational 
attainment and tenure with the organization.2  The correlations in Table 4 indicate that the larger 
frauds are associated with the following variables: collusion (multiple perpetrators), higher 
salaries, age, longer tenure with the organization prior to the detection and educational level (p < 
.01, one-tail test) and to a lesser extent with males (p < .05).3  An examination of the data 
suggests the following profiles: 
The typical (median) fraud case resulted in a loss of less than $50,000 and was committed 
by a female with no criminal record who earned less than $50,000 per year and had worked for 
the nonprofit at least three years.  More than 25 percent of the reported frauds were conducted by 
managers and 8.6 percent of the perpetrators were executives.  The most costly frauds were those 
perpetrated by male manager/executives earning between $100,000 and $149,000 per year. Fraud 
committed by organization managers resulted in the greatest median loss to the organization 
($150,000).   
The perpetrators’ ages ranged from 20 to 62, with median age of 41.  Median tenure with 
the organization was seven years, but ranged from less than one year to 35 years.  The greatest 
losses were from those perpetrators who had been with the organization the longest (more than 
ten years with a median loss of $223,000) and were between the age of 51 and 60 (median loss of 
$257,000).   
Collusion exists when two or more people combine to perpetrate the fraud.  Although 
only 18.6 percent of the frauds involved collusion, the median loss was more than four times that 
of frauds perpetrated by a single individual.  As part of the survey data gathering, respondents 
were asked to disclose the criminal history of the perpetrator(s).  Most perpetrators had not been 
charged or convicted of any crime prior to the fraud, and the size of the loss was not correlated 
with criminal background.  
3.2 Types of fraud committed against nonprofit organizations  
J. T. Wells (2005) reports three major types of occupational frauds. The first is 
misappropriation of assets and occurs when organization’s assets are stolen or misused. The 
second is referred to as corruption and occurs when influence is inappropriately used in an 
economic transaction. Third, financial statement fraud is the deliberate falsification of an entity’s 
financial statements. 
Asset misappropriations comprise more than 97 percent of all reported frauds. It was by 
far the most common among the nonprofit organizations.  Financial statement fraud (J. T. Wells 
2005) was the least common, representing only 5 percent of the nonprofit sample.  However, the 
median loss from the three cases of financial statement fraud, at $3 million, was 30 times greater 
than the median $100 thousand loss from asset misappropriations. 
Cash is the most common type of asset misappropriated in our sample.  Almost 95 
percent of all reported asset misappropriations involved cash, with a median loss of $100,000.  
However, noncash misappropriations resulted in the same median loss.  According to J. T. Wells 
(2005, 13) there are three major types of cash misappropriations:  Skimming occurs when cash is 
stolen before it is recorded. Larceny exists when cash is stolen after it is recorded. The third type 
of cash misappropriation is fraudulent disbursements that occur when the organization pays an 
expense that it does not owe. More than 75 percent of cash misappropriations involved 
fraudulent disbursements, with a median loss of $145,000.  Only skimming, which represented 
22.4 percent of the sample, had a smaller median loss of $40,000.   
Since fraudulent disbursements comprise the majority of cash misappropriation, the 
survey asked respondents to identify losses by type of fraudulent disbursements. There are five 
major types of fraudulent disbursement transactions: (1) Fraudulent billing occurs when false or 
inflated invoices are paid. (2) Payroll fraud occurs when a payroll check is issued based on 
overstated hours worked or to fictitious “ghost” employees. (3) Expense reimbursement fraud 
occurs when falsified claims for expenses are submitted by employees for such things as travel 
reimbursement. (4) Check tampering occurs when an organization’s check is stolen or altered. 
(5) Fraudulent register disbursements occur when false entries are made in a cash register or cash 
refunds are made from the register without documentation. 
Fraudulent billing is the most common type of fraudulent disbursement, comprising 
almost 50 percent of the total.  However, the most costly fraud involves register disbursements, 
with a median loss of over $350,000.  The least costly type of fraudulent disbursement is expense 
reimbursement, with a median loss of only $83,373. 
Corruption is the wrongful use of influence in a business transaction to procure benefits 
for one’s self or others at the expense of one’s employer (J. T. Wells 2005). Corruption occurred 
in slightly more than 20 percent of all reported cases.  Corruption appears to have an impact on 
the size of the fraud:  the median loss to organizations reporting corruption as part of the fraud 
was $189,400 Organizations not reporting corruption lost less than half that amount. Corruption 
includes four major practices: (1)  Bribes - cash or another asset is accepted or paid to aid in the 
fraud.  (2) Rewards - an improper gift is accepted or paid after the fraud. (3) Extortion - an asset 
is obtained by force or the threat of force. (4) Conflicts of interest – one party to the transaction 
is not independent.  
Conflict of interest was the most frequently reported type of corruption but had only a 
median loss of $200,000 per incident. The second most common type of corruption was bribes, 
comprising one-third of those organizations reporting corruption and resulting in median losses 
of $269,000. Losses related to cases of extortion were $100,000 (median) and the largest 
corruption losses appeared in cases of improper gifts with a median loss of $3 million.  
Fraudulent financial statements have been widely publicized in the business sector.  
Typically, financial statements are falsified by:  (1) overstating revenues, (2) understating 
liabilities or expenses, (3) recognizing revenue or expenses in the wrong period, (4) reporting 
assets at either less or more than the actual value, or (5) failing to disclose significant 
information. Three cases of fraudulent nonprofit financial statements were reported by the fraud 
examiners.  Overstating revenues resulted in the largest loss at $10,000,000.  Inappropriate asset 
valuation and lack of disclosures both resulted $100,000 losses.  
3.3 Discovery of Fraud and Legal Outcomes 
More than 86 percent of the sample organizations had undergone external audits, much 
higher than the rate of audits experienced by the overall nonprofit population. The survey asked 
firms about five types of internal controls: background checks on new employees, presence of an 
anonymous reporting method, existence of an internal auditing or fraud examination function, 
annual audit by certified public accountant, and carrying insurance to cover losses from fraud.   
After the external audit, the next most common control was bonding key employees or other 
types of insurance against fraud (60 percent of organizations). Internal audit departments and 
anonymous fraud hotlines existed at 40 percent of organizations but just 21 percent did 
background checks.  As indicated by the correlations presented in Table 3, older and larger 
organizations tend to have more internal controls or an internal audit function in place.   
Survey respondents were asked to identify how the frauds were discovered.4  Over 43 
percent of the frauds were detected by tips, with half of those coming from employees, while 
only a quarter of the frauds were detected by the internal audit department. Tips from vendors 
led to detection of the frauds with the greatest losses.   Frauds detected through customer tips 
were the smallest with a median loss of $2,600. More than 22 percent of the reported frauds were 
caught by accident while only 12 percent were found by the external auditor. Internal controls 
were credited with helping to detect nearly 14 percent of the cases while an internal audit 
department detected another ten percent. The fact that nearly two-thirds of the reported frauds 
were discovered as the result of tips or by accident is consistent with earlier findings (Midkiff 
2004, Fremont-Smith and Kosaras 2003).  
Although internal controls and internal and external audits were useful in identifying a 
third of the fraud cases, we found no reduction in the size of fraud losses for those nonprofit 
organizations that had internal or external audits (Table 3). However, this is a truncated sample: 
internal controls and audits may have deterred fraud in other nonprofit organizations.  
When a fraud is discovered, the organization can charge the perpetrator(s) criminally 
and/or civilly.  Seventy-two percent of the nonprofit frauds resulted in termination, but seven 
percent resulted in no punishment.  In comparison, for-profit fraudsters were more likely to be 
terminated (88 percent) but had an equal chance of not being punished (6.5 percent), This does 
not mean that employers necessarily retained the fraudsters. In many cases, it was reported that 
the perpetrator quit or disappeared when it became apparent that his or her scheme was about to 
be discovered.  Not surprisingly, large losses were more commonly referred to law enforcement 
for criminal prosecution (72 percent).  The median loss related to frauds reported to the 
authorities was $140,000 as compared to just $6,700 when no criminal referral was made.  Of 
those cases resulting in criminal prosecution, 70 percent of the accused individuals pled guilty or 
no contest and there were five acquittals.  The prosecutor declined to prosecute in 25 percent of 
the cases, possibly because of insufficient evidence.  These findings are consistent with Fremont-
Smith (2004a, 336): Only those cases with a strong probability of success are prosecuted. In that 
study of press reports, there were 26 guilty or no contest pleas and three convictions out of 32 
cases..  
Survey respondents were aware of only seven civil suits that were filed. Despite claims 
that organizations are hesitant to prosecute fraud offenders, the survey indicated that a majority 
of victim organizations referred their cases to law enforcement authorities. The 70 percent 
referral rate is higher than anecdotal evidence frequently suggests. However, the median loss 
from those cases that were pursued civilly was more than twice as large as those cases where no 
civil suit was filed. Of the civil suits that were filed, four were still pending, one was settled, one 
resulted in a judgment for the organization, and one resulted in the insurance company being 
sued.  When survey respondents were asked why they believed no legal action was taken, the 
answers varied and ranged from “fear of bad publicity” to “internal discipline sufficient” to “lack 
of evidence”.   
Finally, survey respondents were asked what percentage of the loss was recovered.  Fifty 
percent recovered nothing with a median loss of $95,873.   Thirty-four percent completely 
recovered their loss (median loss of $25,350).  The insured organizations recovered about 57 
percent of their loss.  
4. Lessons Learned - Fraud and Loss Prevention   -  
Albrecht et al (1984) state that, taken as a group, occupational fraud perpetrators are hard 
to profile and that fraud is difficult to predict. Their research assembled a list of pressure, 
opportunity, and integrity variables that resulted in a list of possible red flags or indicators of 
occupational fraud and abuse. These variables fell into two primary classes: perpetrator 
characteristics and organizational environment. Chief among the personal characteristics was 
high personal debts and living beyond ones means. The primary organizational characteristics 
were a lack of enforcement of clear lines of authority and proper procedures for authorization of 
transactions.  
4.1 Protection 
Nonprofit organizations tend to invest in insurance or surety bonds to protect against 
fraud typically after a loss has been incurred (Ayers 2006).  Insurance companies generally 
require that nonprofit clients make sure someone other than the treasurer reviews the monthly 
financial statements.  The insurance coverage also requires an annual audit.  
Some nonprofits are attempting to boost accountability by providing orientation to 
volunteers about thefts and increasing training efforts. Interestingly, parent-teacher association 
and organization leaders believe that some of the simplest policies would be good enough to stop 
90 percent of the fraud (Ayers 2006).  
4.2 Board Membership 
  Improving the quality of the board could improve accountability and lessen fraud. One of 
the most effective ways to reduce wrongdoing is to create a positive workplace environment 
(AICPA 2002b). The board can help set the “tone at the top” for ethical behavior by (1) 
providing a model for ethical behavior and (2) communicating expectations of ethical behavior 
for employees, particularly for employees unable to directly observe management behavior.  
When employees feel abused, ignored or mistreated, they may be more willing to commit fraud.  
In contrast, empowered employees in a positive workplace environment may be more attuned to 
the nonprofit’s mission and less willing to let inefficiency or fraud go unreported.  A strong 
management response to alleged or suspected fraud is also important in deterring future 
incidents. 
 In addition to general advice on fraud prevention, some pertinent recommendations from 
the Independent Sector’s Panel on the Nonprofit Sector (2005) include: 
1. Require independent directors. Three states (California, Maine, and New Hampshire) 
require independent directors serve on the board (Fremont-Smith 2004b).  
2. Prohibit individuals barred by the SEC from serving on the boards of nonprofit 
corporations. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act grants the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission the authority to bar individuals from serving on the boards of publicly 
traded companies subject to the approval of a federal judge or an SEC administrative law 
judge.  
3. Prohibit personal loans to board members and nonprofit executives. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) generally prohibits loans to any directors or executives of publicly owned 
companies,5 and many states expressly prohibit loans to directors and officers of 
nonprofit organizations. Private foundations are already prohibited from making loans to 
board members.  
4.3 Audit Committee 
Current best practice suggests that a nonprofit organization should have a strong board of 
directors that, in turn, creates an audit committee to deter or detect financial mismanagement and 
other fraud within the organization (Owens 2003). Although some claim fraud occurs in 
nonprofit organizations at about the same rate as in for-profit entities, nonprofits organizations 
are particularly vulnerable because of the way they operate.  Nonprofit organizations tend to 
have unpaid boards of directors who may or may not have financial expertise. Nonprofit 
organizations tend to assume that everyone involved with the organization is dedicated to the 
cause.  Accordingly, employees and volunteers operate in an atmosphere of trust.  Essential tasks 
may be undertaken by individuals with little financial expertise and no training in the design of 
appropriate controls against errors or fraud. Without financial expertise at the board level and 
little, or limited, supervisory capabilities at the operation level, a steady flow of cash donations 
become a magnet for fraud. 
Ideally, the audit committee serves as the interface and link between the board and the 
independent auditor. The audit committee may also be charged with oversight of management’s 
performance regarding the financial responsibilities and disclosure obligations. Audit committees 
require effort (Floch 2004).  The committee needs to be staffed with the right people and they 
often must make difficult or unpopular decisions. A board of directors with a diligent audit 
committee has a greater opportunity to discover any financial irregularities before the activities 
create a financial threat to the organization. As discussed above, we recommend having 
independent board members serve on the audit committee.  
Some nonprofit board members believe that an audit committee is not necessary because 
any fraud within the organization will be found by the annual audit process. Prior to SAS No. 99 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA 2002a), auditing standards did 
not encourage fraud detection procedures. Under SAS No. 99, there is a better opportunity for 
the annual audit process to detect at least major fraud activity, but it is not a guarantee.  
Certainly, the external audit cannot be relied upon as the sole detection or prevention strategy.  
Of the 58 cases examined in this study, only ten percent were discovered during the annual audit. 
Nonprofit audit committees and boards must install a variety of methods to reduce the risk of 
loss from fraud.   Some key recommendations to reduce the risk of fraud as set forth by Floch 
(2004) and R. Wells (2005) include the following: 
1. Require background checks for all employees with access to cash and other liquid 
assets.   
2. Check the websites of various state charity offices for advisories and final judgments 
identifying individuals or fundraising firms involved with fraud as well as more 
general advice on fraud prevention and detection. 
3. Consider insurance or bonding for all employees with access to cash or other assets. 
4. Make it easy for employees, vendors, customers and others to confidentially report 
suspected fraud or abuses.6  
5. Periodically review internal controls to make sure that they are capable of detecting 
more than just small frauds.  Managers, executives and others in positions of power 
have opportunities to bypass internal controls and perpetrate major frauds. When 
CFEs were asked on a scale of one (ineffective) to five (effective) about the rankings 
of fraud prevention measures, strong internal controls ranked higher (3.66) than any 
other measure (J. T. Wells 2005, 41).  The ACFE recommends the use of their “fraud 
prevention check-up” to help identify and fix problems before it is too late (ACFE 
2004).  This might be an excellent resource for nonprofit audit committees. 
6. Most important of all, educate employees about the consequences and the harm that 
perpetrating fraud or abuse would be to them, the organization, its charitable mission, 
and their clients. 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Nonprofit organizations are by no means immune to fraud losses.  This study discussed 
characteristics of 58 fraud cases reported in a survey conducted by the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners.  Investigations of these cases were complete and the Certified Fraud Examiner 
(CFE) was reasonably sure that the perpetrator(s) had been identified.  While the dollar amounts 
were often small, some cases involved large dollar losses for the nonprofit organization.  In total, 
nearly $30 million was wasted – presumably thousands of people did not receive charitable 
goods and services that could have been provided had these nonprofit organizations been able to 
prevent the crimes.   
Nonprofit board members and management need to be made aware of the magnitude of 
the risks related to occupational fraud so that they can take steps to limit the frequency and 
amount of losses.  Human failings lead trusted people to abuse their positions.  Greed is part of 
the problem but opportunity makes temptation harder to resist and then the crime is rationalized 
as a way to “make up” for low wages or other perceived affronts.    
Outsiders no longer take for granted the good intentions of nonprofit organizations. The 
general public expects nonprofit organizations to establish sound internal controls, distribute 
external audit documents, and provide more performance information to both the internal and 
external stakeholders (Birchard 2005). Nonprofit organizations must convince the public that 
they have the right systems and policies in place to ensure that contributions and other resources 
are being prudently maintained, managed and deployed. It is not necessarily about money but 
rather the fiduciary responsibility to use donated funds in the manner intended.  
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Figure 1 
 
From: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2005),  2004 Report to the Nation, p. 10. (Reproduced with 
permission) 
 Table 1 
Organizational Victims of Fraud with Median Dollar Loss 
 
Type of Organization 
Percentage 
of the 508 Reported Cases Median Loss from Fraud 
Private Company 41.8 $123,000 
Public Company 30.2 100,000 
Government Agency 15.8 37,500 
Nonprofit Organization 12.2 100,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Characteristics of the Victims and Perpetrators of Fraud in Nonprofit Organizations 
 
Panel A – Means & Distribution N Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Size of organization - total 
employees 58 4,606  58  0  100,000  
Age of organization -- years in 
business 56 40.2  30  1  183  
Number of perpetrators involved in 
the scheme 58 1.6  1  1  14  
Age of principal perpetrator 52 41.0  41  20  62  
Tenure with organization (in years) 
of main perpetrator  52 7.4  4  1  35  
Total Dollar Loss Caused by the 
Fraud 56  $ 535,104  $ 100,000  $ 200   $ 17,000,000 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 – Pearson Correlations between Characteristics of Victim  
Organizations and Existence of Select Controls 
 
 Loss Employees Organization Age 
1.000  0.002  (0.049)  
Total Loss (natural log) 56  56  54  
0.088  1.000  0.682 *** 
Size of organization - total employees 56  58  56  
(0.099)  0.325 *** 1.000  
Age of organization—years in business 54  56  56  
(0.016)  0.309 *** 0.615 *** 
Number of internal controls (ranging from 0 to 5) 56  58  56  
0.072  0.456 *** 0.549 *** 
Anonymous tip mechanism (1=yes, 0=no) 56  58  56  
(0.099)  0.376 *** 0.658 *** 
Internal audit function (1=yes, 0=no) 56  58  56  
0.136  0.101  0.167  
External audit (1=yes, 0=no) 56  58  56  
0.004  (0.229) ** 0.181 * 
Bonding or insurance (1=yes, 0=no) 56  58  56  
(0.105)  0.269 ** 0.297 ** 
Background checks (1=yes, 0=no) 56  58  56  
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
Note: n for each correlation is shown below correlation.  
 
Table 4 – Correlation Matrix for Characteristics of Perpetrators 
 Loss Number of Perpetrators 
Age of 
Perpetrator 
Tenure with 
Employer Salary Gender 
Education 
Level 
Criminal 
Record 
1.000  0.414 *** 0.479 *** 0.481 *** 0.526 *** 0.259 ** 0.400 *** (0.021)Total Loss 
  (natural log)  56  56  50  51  54  55  40  56
Number of perpetrators 0.261 ** 1.000  (0.037)  0.078  0.189 * 0.098  0.000  (0.050)
56  58  52  52  56  57  56  58
0.468 *** (0.121)  1.000  0.473 *** 0.620 *** 0.294 ** 0.190 * (0.058)Age of principal perpetrator  
50  52  52  50  52  52  51  52
0.388 *** (0.006)  0.445 *** 1.000  0.369 *** 0.020  (0.064)  (0.148)Tenure (in years) of main 
perpetrator with organization  51  52  50  52  52  52  51  52
0.448 *** 0.018  0.583 *** 0.393 *** 1.000  0.429 *** 0.138  (0.064)Main perpetrator's annual income 
(ordinal)  54  56  52  52  56  56  55  56
0.290 ** (0.014)  0.314 ** (0.050)  0.420 *** 1.000  0.212 * (0.177) *Gender  
  (1=male, 0= female)  55  57  52  52  56  57  56  57
0.438 *** (0.133) 0.564 *** (0.025) 0.540 *** 0.550 *** 1  (0.152)Main perpetrator's highest 
educational level (ordinal)  40  40 36 37 39 40 56  40
(0.022)  0.177 * (0.042) (0.147) (0.108) (0.177) * (0.156)  1
Main perpetrator previously 
charged or convicted of fraud 
(1=yes, 0=no) 56  58 52 52 56 57 40  58
Note: Pearson parametric correlations are in lower left and Spearman rank-order correlations are in the upper right of the matrix. The n for each correlation is 
presented below it. 
 
  * Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
  
 
Notes 
1.  Statistics on the size of the nonprofit sector were obtained from various documents available on June 26, 
2006 at http://www.independentsector.org.  The information is derived primarily from Independent Sector (2002) 
but more up-to-date facts are provided on-line. 
2.  The majority of perpetrators were female (71 percent) which is consistent with the concentration of 
females in the nonprofit workforce (estimated at 70 percent by the Urban Institute). Incidents of fraud in the overall 
study (ACFE 2005) were almost evenly divided between males and females. The “glass ceiling” phenomenon is 
prevalent in all types of entities – men tend to be in positions with more authority and therefore have more access to 
organizational assets (Joslyn 2003). The ACFE (2005) reported that median losses in schemes perpetrated by males 
was significantly higher than losses caused by females in both 2004 and 2002. 
3.  Salary and level of education are ordinal measures and should be evaluated using the Spearman 
correlations in the upper-left portion of the table.   
4.  In a few cases, CFE respondents indicated multiple detection methods per case.  Therefore the 
percentages mentioned do total to more than 100 percent. 
5.  During the pre-SOX era, recent evidence suggests that financial statement fraud (the most costly type) 
was more prevalent in for-profit corporations that made loans to executives (Cullinan et al. 2006). 
6.  A whistleblower mechanism (along with record retention rules) is one of the few parts of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 that applies to private organizations including nonprofit entities. (See McDowell 2004). 
 
